Grupos de Investigación

Seminario IECON: "Static and Dynamic Incentives in Selection Markets"

Presenta Sebastián Fleitas (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven). En coautoría con Juan Pablo Atal and Eduardo Azevedo.

We study the optimal combination of static and dynamic incentives in community-rated markets. We use a simple two-period model to derive general lessons. Overall, under worsening health, prices are generally increasing over time, pointing to the desirability of dynamic (late-enrollment) penalties as used in markets like Medicare Part D. However, the desirability of dynamic incentives is reduced when consumers fail to internalize them due to a lack of understanding or forward-looking behavior. To provide policy lessons, we calibrate a multiple-period version of our model to the context of Medicare Part D. Under our preferred assumptions, the optimal late enrollment penalty in Medicare Part D is positive but lower than the level currently set by the regulation.

Fecha: 13/09/2022
Horario: 11:30 a 12:30 hrs
Modalidad presencial: Salón 3 del Edificio de Investigación y Posgrados - Gonzalo Ramírez 1926
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